The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement by Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Voters’ Curses: The Upsides and
Downsides of Political Engagement
Carlo Prato and Stephane Wolton
5. February 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53482/
MPRA Paper No. 53482, posted 9. February 2014 10:20 UTC
The Voters’ Curses:







Scholars have long deplored voters’ lack of interest in politics and argue greater political
engagement would improve the performance of democracy. We consider a model of elections
where successful communication of political messages during campaigns requires efforts by
politicians and a representative voter. The voter’s incentive to pay attention to politics affects
the effectiveness of the electoral process as screening and disciplining device. The performance
of the electoral process and the voter’s level of political activity are low when the voter cares
little about politics–this is the curse of the apathetic voter–, or cares a lot about politics–this
is the curse of the engaged voter. Consequently, an engaged voter is not always an active
voter and fostering political engagement (e.g., by lowering the cost of political information or
facilitating policy changes) might have negative consequences on voter’s attention to politics
and welfare.
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1 Introduction
Democracies require an active electorate to perform well. A representative’s incentive to act in
the voters’ interest depends on their attention and oversight (Tocqueville, 1840; Mill, 1861). The
extent to which voters are able to fulfill their democratic duties is heavily debated. Some argue that
voters are incompetent (Campbell et al., 1960), do not have consistent political beliefs (Converse,
1964), and tend to reward or punish politicians based on outcomes politicians have no control
over (Achen and Bartels, 2004). Others argue that voters “are no fools” (Key, 1966): they make
the best possible choice given the alternatives and information available to them (Downs, 1957).
Despite these disagreements, these scholars share a common premise: an engaged electorate would
improve democratic performance.
We formally investigate that premise through the lenses of a theory of elections where we
distinguish between voters’ engagement–that is, their incentive to pay attention to politics–and
their attention–that is, their cognitive involvement with the electoral process. We show that there
exists a curse of the apathetic voter. Consistently with previous theories of democratic politics,
we find when voters have too little incentive to pay attention to politics, the performance of the
democratic system–measured in term of voters’ welfare–declines. More surprisingly, we uncover a
curse of the engaged voter. Voters can be hurt and their level of political activity might decrease
substantially when they care too much about politics. We show that the electoral process loses
its effectiveness as screening and disciplining device as politicians rationally anticipate that the
electoral reward from running on different platforms changes with voters’ engagement. Politicians’
equilibrium behavior places limits on how active voters can be. In other words, voters’ lack of
attention to politics is not equivalent to voters’ lack of interest. This result has important policy
implications since well-intentioned interventions aimed at encouraging an engaged electorate might
prove unsuccessful or even counterproductive.
Our theory builds upon a formal model of elections where a representative voter chooses be-
tween two candidates, who can be either competent or non-competent. Candidates commit either
to a status quo policy or to some new policy, which imposes an additional policy cost on the
politician.1 The new policy is beneficial to the voter only if implemented by a competent candi-
date, and welfare-damaging, otherwise. We interpret the voter’s net benefit from the new policy
implemented by a competent politician as her political engagement: her incentive to pay attention
1Henceforth, we use the pronoun ‘she’ and ‘he’ for the voter and politician, respectively.
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to the electoral campaign. The voter does not observe a candidate’s competence or his platform,
but can learn the latter during the electoral campaign. Our primary theoretical innovation is to
model electoral campaigns as a joint effort between the voter and candidates, building on Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (2005). How informed the voter is depends on the candidates’ and the voter’s
communication efforts, and the effectiveness of a candidate’s attempts to reach the voter increases
with her attention to the campaign. Our modeling approach to electoral campaigns follows Zaller’s
(1992) “reception axiom”, which states “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with
an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend–in a word, receive–political
messages concerning that issue.”
For the voter, the electoral process performs best (her welfare is maximized) when competent
politicians campaign on the new policy, whereas incompetent politicians choose the status quo
policy. We demonstrate that this welfare-maximizing separating equilibrium exists only if the
voter’s political engagement lies in an intermediate range. A separating equilibrium does not exist
when voter’s political engagement is low. Even if (only) competent candidates were to propose
the new policy, the voter would exert little communication effort. The resulting low probability
that the voter learns a candidate’s platform means that competent candidates have little electoral
incentive to run on the new policy. Consequently, they would deviate and run on the status quo
policy. When political engagement is low, the voter pays too little attention to politics to sustain
the welfare-maximizing separating equilibrium; this is the curse of the apathetic voter.
More surprisingly, a separating equilibrium does not exist when political engagement is high. If
only competent candidates were to propose the new policy, the voter would exert high communica-
tion effort. The resulting high probability of successful communication would depress the electoral
chances of non-competent candidates who do not campaign on the new policy. Consequently, these
candidates would deviate and mimic competent candidates by campaigning on a reformist plat-
form. When political engagement is high, the voter pays too much attention to politics to sustain
the welfare-maximizing separating equilibrium; this is the curse of the engaged voter.
The curse of the apathetic voter produces policy inertia and status quo bias. The curse of the
engaged voter implies that when the voter cares a lot about politics, the electoral process loses
its effectiveness as screening and disciplining device since both competent and non competent
candidates commit to the new policy. The voter pays less attention to politics, as she correctly
anticipates that different types of politicians pool on the same type of campaign, and suffers a
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welfare loss. Even though the voter’s level of political engagement is high, the voter becomes less
politically active.
Our results show that increased political engagement does not necessarily improve the per-
formance of the electoral process. Policies meant to foster interest in politics, such as recent
proposals to increase subsidies for public service broadcasting to lower the cost of political infor-
mation (Soroka et al., 2013; O’Mahen, 2013), might actually reduce voter’s attention to politics
and worsen the performance of the electoral process.
In contrast, we show that the voter might benefit from imposing a higher cost of implementing
the new policy on politicians. When this policy cost is relatively low, the return from being in office
and implementing the new policy is large, and candidates have a strong incentive to exert commu-
nication efforts. The voter then pays close attention to the campaign (due to complementarities in
communication), and the curse of the engaged voter implies that the voter’s welfare-maximizing
equilibrium cannot be sustained. This paper suggests thus an alternative rationale, unrelated to
the traditional ‘tyranny of the majority’ argument (Madison’s Federalist 9 and 51, 1788), for insti-
tutional arrangements that increase the cost of making policy changes (i.e., vetoes, supermajority
requirements, etc.). By increasing institutional inertia, a voter commits not to listen to politicians
too much and ensures the electoral process retains its effectiveness as screening device.
More generally, this paper describes an important trade-off for the design of political institu-
tions. Institutional arrangements that make policy changes difficult (i.e., a high cost of implement-
ing new policies) mute the curse of the engaged voter and the voter is better off when demand
for policy change is high. However, it exacerbates the curse of the apathetic voter competent
politicians have less incentives to implement welfare-improving policy changes when political en-
gagement is relatively low. When crises (defined as a time when political engagement is high) are
rare (frequent), the curse of the apathetic (engaged) voter should be the main concern and low
(high) institutional inertia is more likely to be optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature. In
Section 3, we describe our theory of elections and some general preliminary results. In Section 4,
we uncover the existence of the curse of the apathetic voter and the curse of the engaged voter. In
Section 5, we discuss voter’s attention and welfare in different equilibria. In Section 6, we discuss
the implications of our results. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in Appendix A. In a
supplemental appendix, we show that provided that the screening problem faced by the voter is
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severe enough, the separating equilibrium on which this paper focuses (i.e., where only competent
candidates commit to the new policy) is welfare maximizing (Appendix B).2
2 Literature review
It has long been recognized that the responsiveness of democratic systems decrease when voters are
not politically involved (Tocqueville, 1840; Mill, 1861). However, the extent to which voters have
the capacity to fulfill their democratic duty has been heavily debated by several generations of
scholars. Several studies document voters’ incompetence (Campbell et al., 1960; Delli Carpini and
Keeter, 1996), lack of consistent beliefs (Lippmann, 1925; Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992), or lack of
the necessary discerning abilities to punish or reward politicians (Achen and Bartles, 2004; Wolfers,
2007; Leigh, 2009; Healy and Malhotra, 2009). Other scholars have argued that “voters are no
fools”, they make the best possible choice given the alternatives available to them (Key, 1966),
the information presented to them (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1993; Lupia and McCubbins,
1998) and the cost and benefit of collecting political information (Downs, 1957; Page, 1978).
Despite these major disagreements, both strands of the literature share two common features.
First, they consider exclusively voters, thereby disregarding how politicians’ platform and electoral
communication might respond to varying levels of voters’ engagement and attention. Second, they
argue that a more engaged electorate would improve the performance of the democratic system.
This paper shows that this claim needs to be qualified when the strategic interdependency between
voters and politicians is accounted for. Fostering political engagement might actually reduce voters’
welfare and attention to politics. Furthermore, how much voters care about politics cannot be
inferred from how much attention they pay to politics.
The importance of considering the strategic interdependency between voters and politicians has
been stressed in the political agency literature. As Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2013) points
out, once this interdependency is taken into account it is no longer clear that voters benefit from
being highly rational or more informed. In particular, too much information might hurt the voter
by inducing politicians to pander to voters (Prat, 2005; Fox, 2007; Fox and Van Weelden, 2012), to
promote too much policy changes (Levy, 2007), or to behave too uniformly (Ashworth and Bueno
de Mesquita, 2013). We share several features with this literature, but also show that the problem
2The supplemental appendix can be found on the corresponding author’s website: http://home.uchicago.edu/
swolton/Research.html
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might be more fundamental than previously thought. The voter is never too informed in our model,
but she might care too much about politics. We also show that electoral competition, far from
alleviating the negative consequences of voters’ incentives to listen to politics, might exacerbate
it.3
In this paper, we equate voters’ attention to politics with attention to electoral campaigns.
This follows a long research tradition which has stressed the importance of electoral campaigns
for the functioning of democracy (Key, 1966; Page and Brody, 1972; Page, 1978; Alvarez, 1997).
During campaigns, voters learn about candidates and their platforms (Franklin, 1991; Brians and
Wattember, 1996; Freedman et al., 2004) and candidates “inform, persuade, and mobilize” voters
(Norris, 2002 p.128, emphasis in the text; see also Salmore and Salmore, 1989; Holbrook, 2011).4
As illustrated by John Zaller’s “reception axiom,” the effect of an electoral campaign on voters’
electoral decision depends on their attention to it (see also McAllister, 2002; Franz, 2011; Murphy,
2011).
In formal works on the electoral process, most notably Hotelling-Black-Downs models, voters
generally observe costlessly and perfectly candidates’ platform (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). We
are not the first to relax these assumptions. A more recent line of research acknowledges that it
is costly to inform voters about a candidate’s platform or valence (Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004a and
b; Ashworth, 2006; Wittman, 2007; Prato and Wolton, 2013a), change their evaluation of candi-
dates by increasing name recognition (Grossman and Helpman, 1996), or increase the salience of
some issues (Aragone`s et al., 2013). Other papers highlight how voters can use campaign perfor-
mance to learn about candidates’ competence, but assume costless dissimination of information
(Bhattacharya, 2012; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve, 2013), who are passive recipient of electoral in-
formation. Hortala-Vallve et al. (2013) considers a model where candidates choose a tax policy
and voters need to pay a cost to learn candidates’ platforms. Candidates are all identical and so
more incentives to learn candidates’ platforms always benefit the median voter. We show that this
result no longer holds when candidates are heterogeneous in term of competence.5
3The idea that electoral competition encourages risk-taking is also present in Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2013).
4It is not surprising then that candidates spend millions during campaigns. According to the Center for Respon-
sive Politics, Barack Obama and John McCain spent $1.06bn during the 2008 presidential campaign, and Barack
Obama and Mitt Romney’s expenditures amounted to $1.15bn during the 2012 presidential campaign.
5Several other papers examine voters’ incentives to acquire information (Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006; Austen-
Smith and Feddersen, 2009; Gershkov and Szentes, 2009; Oliveros, 2013; Tyson, 2013). But voters then choose
between fixed alternatives and so these papers cannot study the strategic interdependence between voters and
politicians.
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3 A theory of elections and preliminary results
Our theory of elections builds upon a formal model featuring a one-period, three-player game with
two candidates (1 and 2) and a representative voter. The candidates compete for an elected office,
which they value. Before the campaign, each candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his type
tj ∈ {c, n} (where c denotes competent and n denotes non-competent politician), and commits
to a platform: either the status quo policy (pj = 0) or some new policy (pj = 1), which he can
implement at an additional policy cost. It is common knowledge that the proportion of competent
candidates is q = Pr(t = c). The new policy is beneficial to the voter (compared to a party’s
traditional policy) only if it is implemented by a competent politician.
The new policy can be thought as an experiment where success does not depend on the state of
the world (as in Callander 2011a and b), but on a politician’s competence.6 It can be a change of
economic paradigm such as Latin America moving from import substitution industrialization to free
market in the 1980’s. It can also take the form of institutional reforms such as the decentralization
reform in Bolivia in 1994 (see Grindle, 2000). It can be related to a policy overhaul on an important
issue such as environmental policy (e.g., Nixon’s reform in 1970), health care policy (e.g., Obama’s
reform in 2009-2010), or labor market policy (e.g., the reforms in New Zealand in the 1990’s).
Using Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) terminology, the new policy corresponds to a hard issue,
whereas the status quo policy is an easy issue, less technical and with a more established presence
in public discussion.
In line with the literature on voters’ behavior, we consider an imperfectly informed voter. She
does not know candidates’ competence and can only observe candidates’ platforms if she pays
attention to the electoral campaign. We assume that how informed the voter is depends on her
and candidates’ communication efforts. We model electoral communication as a team problem,
building on Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). A player exerts communication effort at a cost, and
other players do not observe his effort. When candidate j exerts communication effort yj ∈ [0, 1]
and the voter exerts communication effort xj ∈ [0, 1] toward candidate j, the probability that the
voter observes the candidate’s platform is yjxj (Figure 1). After the campaign, the voter elects
one of the two candidates, denoted by e ∈ {1, 2}.
6For example, competent politicians are more successful at designing the scope, pace of some policy change, and
the compensation of winners and losers resulting from it (Haggard and Webb, 1993). They might be less likely to
pander to vested interests (Krueger, 1993). Badly engineered policy changes impose a large cost on society as the
experience of Latin America in the 1980s illustrates (Dornbusch, 1988; Krueger, 1993).
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Notice that our assumptions regarding the campaigning technology imply that fixing the voter’s
attention, a higher candidate’s communication effort (e.g., increased number of ads) increases
the probability that the voter becomes informed about what the candidate will do if elected.
Inversely, for a given number of ads from a candidate, if the voter pays more attention, the
probability she learns the candidate’s platform increases. Our campaigning technology satisfies
Zaller (1992)’s reception axiom, which states that greater cognitive engagement with an issue
increases the probability a voter receives a candidate’s message. It is also in line with empirical
evidence documenting that voters learn incrementally (Neuman et al., 1992).
Figure 1: Campaign as a team effort
The voter’s utility function depends on the policy implemented by the elected candidate. When
a candidate implements the status quo policy, the voter’s payoff is 0. When a candidate implements
the new policy, the voter’s payoff depends on the politician’s competence. When the elected
politician is competent, the voter gets a utility gain of G > 0. When he is non-competent, the
voter experiences a utility loss of L < 0.7 We refer to the parameter G as the gain from change
for the voter.
As explained above, listening to candidates is costly for the voter (captured by a cost function
Cv(.)). This cost can be understood as the effort of deciphering a candidate’s message or the
7The main results of this paper (the existence of a curse of the apathetic voter and a curse of the engaged voter)
would go through if there were N > 1 voters instead of one as long as there is sufficient commonality of interest
between voters. In this case, voters’ level of attention is still directly affected by G, which is the key force driving
our results as we show below.
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opportunity cost of paying attention to the campaign instead of undertaking other activities.8 The
voter’s utility function is:
uv(pe, x1, x2) =
 peG− Cv(x1)− Cv(x2) if e is competentpeL− Cv(x1)− Cv(x2) otherwise (1)
Candidates are office-motivated, and we normalize their payoff from being outside of office to 0. If
elected, a politician gets a payoff of 1 if he implements the status quo policy and 1− kt, t ∈ {c, n}
if he implements the new policy (p = 1). The policy cost of implementing the new policy depends
on the politician’s competence: 0 < kc < kn < 1. As noted by Hall and Deardoff (2006), any policy
change entails a cost for politicians promoting it: cost of collecting information, striking a bargain
with veto players, etc. We suppose that a competent politician is more able at undertaking these
tasks.9
We also suppose that communicating with the voter is costly for candidates (function C(.)).
Candidates can make broad statements without substance or announcements detailing a candi-
date’s plan (Dewan and Hortola-Vallve, 2013). We focus on the second type of discourse, which we
deem more costly than vague statements. This cost can be assimilated to the difficulty of defining
and disseminating (i.e., airing ads, organizing meetings, conventions, press conferences, etc.) a
clear and effective message to the voter in a noisy environment.
Candidate j (j ∈ {1, 2})’s utility is:
uj(pj, yj; t) =
 1− ktpj − C(yj) if elected−C(yj) otherwise (2)
To summarize, the timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws the candidates’ type: tj ∈ {c, n}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
2. Each candidate observes (only) his type and chooses a platform: the status quo policy
(pj = 0), or the new policy (pj = 1); j ∈ {1, 2}.
8For example, it could represent the opportunity cost of watching parties’ nominating convention in the U.S.,
candidates’ press conferences, or news reports about candidates, rather than more entertaining TV programs. The
assumption that the communication effort is directed simplifies the analysis without affecting the main results.
9A type c candidate’s policy cost can also be lower if politicians care about their place in history books, which
depends on the impact of policy changes (Howell, 2013). At the price of complicating the exposition, we can also
assume that the politician cares about the voter’s welfare (as long as its weight in his utility function is less than
the gain from being elected).
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3. The electoral campaign takes place. Candidates 1 and 2, and the voter exert communication
efforts, respectively: y1, y2, and x = (x1, x2).
With probability yjxj, communication is successful: the voter observes candidate j’s platform
(pj). Otherwise, the voter does not learn pj.
4. The voter elects one of the two candidates: e ∈ {1, 2}.
5. The elected candidate e implements pj and payoffs are realized.
Note that candidates can only communicate their platform; they cannot credibly reveal their type
to the voter directly.10 For analytical tractability, we assume that candidates implement the policy
they have chosen.11 This implies communication affects only their chances of being elected, not
their payoff once in office.
In what follows, we assume the following.
Assumption 1. −L/G = τ > q
1−q
Assumption 1 implies that the voter, absent updates on her prior about candidate j’s type,
prefers the status quo policy to the new policy. Therefore, a competent politician who chooses
pj = 1 must convince the voter that he is competent to be elected.
Assumption 2. The cost functions Cv(.) and C(.) satisfy the following properties:
i: Cv(.) and C(.) are twice continuously differentiable;
ii: C ′v(0) = 0 = C
′(0) and limx→1C ′v(x) =∞ = limy→1C ′(y);
iii: C ′′v (0) = 0 = C
′′(0) and C ′′v (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0, 1],C ′′(y) > 0, ∀y ∈ (0, 1];
iv: The third derivatives exist and satisfy: C ′′′v (.) ≥ 0 and C ′′′(.) ≥ 0 on [0, 1].
10The main results of this paper still hold when the voter receives a signal of the candidate’s competence as long
as this signal is sufficiently noisy. This is because the voter does not care about competence per se, but wants to
elect a competent candidate who commits to the new policy. Therefore, the voter always has some incentive to exert
communication effort to learn about a candidate’s platform. Consequently, the mechanism driving the curse of the
apathetic voter and the curse of the engaged voter (described below) is still present with noisy signals.
11This can be justified by assuming, for example, that, in unmodeled period 2, the voter receives information
about candidates’ platforms and is able to hold his elected representative accountable if she does not uphold his
commitment.
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Assumptions 2.i and 2.ii are analogous to assumptions on the communication cost function
in Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). We add two novels assumption: Assumptions 2.iii and As-
sumptions 2.iv. Assumptions 2.iii is a sufficient condition for competent candidates and the voter
to exert strictly positive communication effort when candidates play a separating strategy profile
(i.e., only competent candidates commit to the reform policy).12 Assumptions 2.iv guarantees that
the equilibrium communication strategies are unique when candidates play a separating strategy
profile.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies (with the
caveat that the voter tosses a fair coin to decide which candidate to elect when indifferent), and
excluding weakly-dominated strategies. A formal definition of the equilibrium can be found in
Appendix A (see Definition 1). The term ‘equilibrium’ refers to this class of equilibria. We study
the simplest set-up to convey the intuition for our results. In particular, in the present model, the
assumption that candidates are symmetric is key to derive our results. In a previous draft of the
manuscript (Prato and Wolton, 2013b), we extend the set-up to include asymmetries and show
our main results still hold true.
We now present some general preliminary results regarding the equilibrium behavior of the
voter and candidates. First, the voter’s electoral decision. The voter elects the candidate who
gives her the highest expected payoff given her beliefs about the candidates’ competence, which
are shaped by the electoral campaign. The voter infers a candidate’s competence from his campaign
performance. Our first result is that successful communication always raises the voter’s equilibrium
posterior that the candidate is competent and as a consequence, his electoral chances.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, a candidate’s probability of winning the election is (weakly) greater
after successful communication.
Given the voter’s election rule, we consider when a candidate chooses to invest in informative
communication with the voter. We find that candidates do not always engage in costly communi-
cation.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, a candidate exerts strictly positive communication effort if and
only if he commits to the reform policy (p = 1).
12We assume that C ′′v (0) = 0 = C
′′(0) for exposition purposes. It is sufficient that the second derivatives of both
communication cost functions are bounded above at 0.
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Due to the absence of a policy cost, committing to the status quo policy (p = 0) can be
understood as a default option for a politician. A candidate has no incentive to pay a cost to
reveal that he commits to his default option. Consequently, the voter places high probability
on a candidate promising no change when communication is unsuccessful, implying a candidate
must exert some strictly positive communication effort when he commits to the reform policy.
An important consequence of Lemma 2 is that a candidate faces a double cost when he chooses
p = 1. First, he must pay a policy cost (kt), but only if he is elected. Second, he must incur a
communication cost C(y), borne regardless of the electoral outcome.
4 The voter’s curses
In this section, we describe the curse of the apathetic voter and the curse of the engaged voter.
We study under which conditions there exists an equilibrium when candidates play a separating
strategy, that is a candidate commits to the new policy only if competent. We will refer to this
equilibrium as separating (slightly abusing the usual terminology). We focus on this equilibrium
because for a given gain from change (G), the voter’s welfare is maximized when candidates play
a separating strategy as long as the screening problem faced by the voter is serious enough (see
Appendix B).13 By the analysis above (Lemmata 1 and 2), a separating equilibrium exists only if
for a competent candidate, the electoral reward for committing to the new policy is greater than
the policy cost and the communication cost; this is a competent candidate’s incentive compati-
bility constraint. A non-competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint is the reverse
inequality: his policy cost must be large enough so that he chooses the status quo policy.
We first study the players’ communication strategies when candidates separate. The next
lemma shows that candidates’ and voter’s equilibrium communication strategies are unique.
Lemma 3. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists. The equilibrium communication efforts are
unique and satisfy:
i. type n candidates exerts no communication effort: y∗j (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2};
13When non-competent politicians’ policy cost is large, the screening problem faced by the voter is relatively
mild and an asymmetric assessment when a candidate chooses the new policy independent of his competence and
his opponent chooses the new policy only if competent might lead to a better expected welfare for the voter (see
Appendix B for more details).
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ii. type c candidates and the voter exert strictly positive communication efforts: y∗1(c) = y
∗
2(c) ≡
y∗(c) > 0 and x∗1 = x
∗






∗) = q(1− q)G
2
y∗(c) (4)
A non-competent politician does not need to invest in communication since he commits to the
status quo policy, the default option (see Lemma 2). A competent candidate and the voter instead
exert communication effort. Their level of effort equalizes the marginal benefit of an additional unit
of communication effort with its marginal cost. The marginal benefit for a competent candidate
is equal to the increased probability of being elected times the payoff from being in office net
of the policy cost. The voter invests in communication to avoid an electoral mistake: electing
a non-competent candidate −j (where −j denote candidate j’s opponent) when the candidate
j is competent and commits to the new policy (j ∈ {1, 2}). The marginal benefit of additional
communication effort is a reduction in the probability of electing the wrong candidate times the
utility gain from avoiding such an electoral mistake. Consequently, the voter’s communication
effort depends on the gain from change G.
It can be noted that the voter’s communication effort depends on a competent candidate’s
communication effort, and vice versa. This is due to the complementarity in the campaigning
technology (xj ∗yj, j ∈ {1, 2}). As a competent candidate exerts more communication effort (e.g.,
organizes more press conferences), paying attention to the campaign is more efficient for the voter.
As the voter pays more attention, any political message has greater chance to reach the voter.
Using the previous lemma, we can state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a separating equilibrium. We find that a separating equilibrium exists when a competent
candidate’s policy cost is low enough and a non-competent politician’s policy cost is large enough.
Proposition 1. There exist a unique k∗c : R+ → (0, 1) and k∗n : R+ × [0, 1] → (0, 1) such that a
separating equilibrium exists if and only if
i. A type c’s policy cost is not too large: kc ≤ k∗c (G)
ii. A type n’s policy cost is large enough: kn ≥ k∗n(G, kc)
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This result accords with intuition since committing to the new policy acts as a signal of a
politician’s competence and this type of threshold conditions is common in signaling games.
More surprisingly, we find that a non competent candidate’s threshold (k∗n(kc)) depends on
the competent candidate’s policy cost. As the following corollary shows, the threshold for a non-
competent politician is strictly higher than the threshold for a competent politician (see Figure
2)
Corollary 1. ∀kc ≤ k∗c (G), we have: k∗n(G, kc) ≥ k∗c (G), with strict inequality if kc < k∗c (G).
Corollary 1 implies that a non-competent candidate has less incentive to commit to the status
quo policy than a competent one. A non-competent candidate, when he deviates and runs on the
new policy, free-rides on the competent politician’s and voter’s communication efforts. This implies
a high return on communication (high electoral reward compared to the communication cost). To
satisfy the non-competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint, his policy cost must then
be relatively high (compared to a competent candidate’s) to compensate for this free-riding effect.





(b) For high gain from change G′ > G
Figure 2: Equilibrium conditions
The blue area in the figure corresponds to policy costs such that a separating equilibrium exists.
As we noted above, the voter and a competent candidate −j choose their communication
effort to avoid an electoral mistake and increase their electoral prospect, respectively. However, as
Remark 1 shows, their communication efforts also have an unanticipated consequence (from their
perspective) on both types of candidate j’s incentives to commit to the new policy.
Remark 1. When candidates play a separating strategy, an increase in the voter’s or candidate
−j’s communication efforts:
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i. relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of type c candidate j;
ii. tightens the incentive compatibility constraint of type n candidate j (j ∈ {1, 2}).
When the voter pays more attention to candidates’ messages, the return on committing to the
new policy increases for both competent and non-competent candidates. This is a consequence
of two cumulative effects. First, the voter learns candidates’ platform (in particular, candidates’
commitment to the new policy) with greater probability. Consequently, a competent candidate
is more likely to be elected and thus has more incentives to promise changes. Conversely, a non-
competent candidate is less likely to be elected when he faces a competent opponent and thus has
fewer incentives to commit to the status quo policy. As such, electoral competition increases the
incentives of a non-competent candidate to commit to harmful policy change. This level effect
of increased attention is the key mechanism driving our results, and does not depend on the
campaigning technology used in this paper.
Greater voter attention also has a second effect. It increases the efficiency of candidates’
communication efforts and consequently, the return on communication for candidates committing
to the new policy. As explained above, candidates have then greater incentive to run on a reformist
platform. This complementary effect depends on our assumptions on the campaigning technology,
but it is only second-order to derive our results.
A similar logic explains why both types of candidate j are more prone to commit to the new
policy when a competent candidate from the competing party increases his communication effort.
As the voter pays more attention to the electoral campaign, both competent and non-competent
candidates have greater incentives to commit to the new policy. But the voter’s level of attention
is not exogenous in this set-up. In particular, it depends on the voter’s gain from change.
Lemma 4. When candidates play a separating strategy:
i. the voter’s communication effort x∗ increases with the gain from change (G);
ii. type c candidates’ communication efforts y∗(c) increase with the voter’s gain from change
(G).
When the gain from change increases, the benefit of avoiding an electoral mistake increases.
Therefore, the voter becomes more attentive to the electoral campaigns to select the right kind
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of politicians. Since the voter’s communication effort increases, the benefit of investing in com-
munication increases for candidates due to the complementary of communication efforts in the
campaigning technology. Thus, competent candidates’ communication effort increases as well.
Using Remark 1 and Lemma 4, we find that a separating equilibrium exists if and only if the
voter’s gain from change is in an intermediate range.
Proposition 2. There exists an open non-empty set of policy costs (kc, kn) such that there exist
a unique G > 0 and G ∈ (G,∞) such that a separating equilibrium exists if and only if the voter’s
gain from change is in an intermediate range:
G ≤ G ≤ G
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the
voter’s gain from change and the voter’s welfare (see Figure 3b below for an illustration).
Corollary 2. There exists a non-empty open set of policy costs such that an increase in the voter’s
gain from change can decrease the voter’s equilibrium expected payoff.
Suppose only competent types commit to the new policy and the gain from change is low.
The benefit of avoiding an electoral mistake is low so the voter exerts little communication effort
(Lemma 4). This means that the probability that the voter learns a candidate’s platform is low
and there is little electoral reward for committing to the new policy for a competent candidate.
Consequently, a competent candidate proposes the status quo policy and a separating strategy
cannot be an equilibrium. When the voter has little to gain from the new policy, she exerts too
little communication effort for a separating equilibrium to exist, since the voter fails to internalize
the effect of her communication effort on a competent politician’s incentives to commit to the new
policy. This is the curse of the apathetic voter.
Conversely, suppose candidates play a separating strategy and the gain from change is high.
The benefit of avoiding an electoral mistake is high so the voter pays a lot of attention to the
campaign (Lemma 4). There is a high probability that the voter learns candidate’s platform
and so a high electoral reward for committing to the new policy. Consequently, a non competent
candidate deviates and commits to the new policy and a separating equilibrium cannot exist. When
the voter has a lot to gain from the new policy, she exerts too high a communication effort for a
separating equilibrium to exist, since the voter fails to internalize the impact of her communication
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effort on a non-competent candidates’ incentives to commit to the new policy. This is the curse of
the engaged voter.
The comparison of Figures 2a and 2b illustrates how the curse of the engaged voter affects
the equilibrium conditions. When the gain from change increases, the threshold for competent
candidates (k∗c ) increases (i.e., moves right on the figures), but the threshold for the non-competent
candidates (k∗n(.)) increases as well. As a consequence of these two effects, there exist policy costs
such that a separating equilibrium exists when the gain from change is G, but no longer exists
when the gain from change increases to G′ strictly greater than G. These parameter values are
represented in purple in Figure 2b.
As explained above, a competent candidate’s communication effort depends on his benefit
from being in office and implementing the new policy. The complementarity in the campaigning
technology implies that voter’s attention to the campaign also depends on (competent) candidates’
communication efforts. Consequently, we get the following result.
Lemma 5. When candidates play a separating strategy:
i. the voter’s communication effort x∗ decreases with a type c’s policy cost (kc);
ii. a type c candidate’s communication effort y∗(c) decreases with his policy cost.
We know that a candidate’s incentive to commit to the new policy depends on the voter and his
opponent’s communication efforts (Remark 1), which depend on the policy cost of implementing
the new policy (Lemma 5). These two result lead to the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 3. Fix a non-competent candidate’s policy cost kn such that kn > k
∗
c (G), then there
exists a unique kc(G) ∈ [0, k∗c ) such that a separating equilibrium exists if and only if kc ≥ kc(G).
The lower bound kc(G) is increasing with G (strictly if kc(G) > 0).
Corollary 3. There exists a non-empty open set of policy costs such that a decrease in a competent
politician’s policy cost (kc) may decrease the voter’s expected equilibrium payoff.
Suppose candidates play a separating strategy (i.e., only competent politicians commit to the
new policy) and competent candidates’ policy cost (kc) is low. Competent candidates have a lot
to gain from being in office and implementing the new policy. Consequently, they exert high
communication effort when they run on a reformist platform. Due to the complementarity in the
campaigning technology, the voter also exerts high communication effort. It is thus very likely that
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the voter learns a competent candidate’s commitment to the new policy. The electoral reward for
committing to the new policy is high, the probability of winning the election for a non-competent
candidate when he proposes the status quo policy is low (because a competent opponent’s electoral
chances are high). As a result, non-competent candidates prefer to deviate and commit to the new
policy. A separating strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium.
This point is illustrated in Figure 2. The threshold for non-competent candidates k∗n(.) decreases
with the policy cost for competent politician kc. This implies that an increase in kc can make a
separating equilibrium possible even if the non-competent politician’s policy cost kn is kept constant
(in the figure, this corresponds to the policy costs moving from the red to the blue area where a
separating equilibrium exists).
Proposition 3 also indicates that the optimal policy cost from the voter’s perspective depends
on the gain from change. When the gain from change is high, the voter pays much attention to
the campaign and consequently, competent candidates exert greater communication effort. This
implies that the policy cost for competent politician needs to be large to sustain a separating
equilibrium. Consequently, when the gain from change is high, a high policy cost is optimal for
the voter. Inversely, when the gain from change is low, a low policy cost for competent politicians
is optimal for the voter.
5 Voter’s attention and welfare
In the previous section, we established that the welfare-maximizing separating equilibrium does not
always exist. When a separating equilibrium does not exist, multiple equilibria are possible. An
equilibrium where no candidate commits to the new policy always exists. Under certain condition
on the ratio of the gain from change over the loss from change, we can show that there exists an
asymmetric equilibrium when one candidate commits to the new policy whether competent or not,
whereas his opponent commits to the status quo policy independent of his type.14 Potentially,
there exists also an equilibrium when both candidates commit to the new policy whatever their
competence. In these last two cases, electoral communication is not aimed at learning candidates’
platforms, but serves as an imperfect screening device since competent politicians exert more
communication effort as they have more to gain from being in office and implementing the new
14We show the existence of such an equilibrium and discuss its implications in a companion paper (Prato and
Wolton, 2014).
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policy (kc > kn). Successful communication is a positive signal of a candidate’s competence.
All these candidates for equilibrium share two common features. First, the voter’s expected
welfare is lower than when candidates play a separating strategy. The non-existence of a separating
equilibrium implies a welfare loss for the voter (see Appendix B for more details). Second, as the
next proposition shows, the voter can decrease her attention to politics. When no candidate
proposes the new policy, the voter has nothing to gain from listening to the electoral campaign
and so exerts no effort. When the non-competent types of candidate 1 and/or candidate 2 run
on a reformist platform, the voter has less to gain from successful communication since she might
elect the wrong kind of politician who implements a welfare-reducing policy change. Consequently,
when the screening process she faces is serious enough (that is, kn is not too large), she again pays
less attention to the campaign. Politicians’ equilibrium behavior places limits on how attentive,
active the voter can be.
Proposition 4. Denote x(G) the voter’s highest combined equilibrium communication effort as a
function of the gain from change. For a non-empty open set of policy costs, we have:
i. x(G) = 2x∗(G), ∀G ∈ [G,G];
ii. x(G) < x(G) for all G ≤ G;
iii. there exists Ĝ > G such that x(G) < x(G) for all G ∈ (G, Ĝ).
Figure 3 summarizes the main findings of this section. Figure 3a shows the voter’s commu-
nication effort towards candidate 1 as well as candidate 1’s expected communication effort as a
function of the gain from change G. When a separating equilibrium exists (G ∈ [G,G]), the voter
is very active. This is because the voter has a lot to gain from learning candidates’ platform since
only competent candidates commit to the new policy and she is certain to benefit from it. When
the gain from change is below G, a separating equilibrium does not exist due to the curse of the
apathetic voter. An equilibrium when no candidate proposes the new policy exists, and the voter
exerts no communication effort. When the gain from change is above G, a separating equilibrium
does not exist due to the curse of the engaged voter. When a non-competent candidate 1 runs on
a reformist platform as in Figure 3a, the voter pays strictly less attention towards candidate 1.
After successful communication, the voter is not certain she faces a competent candidate who will
implement a welfare-improving policy change. This uncertainty reduces the benefit from successful
communication, and consequently the voter’s equilibrium communication effort.
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The analysis above reveals one of the key implications of our theory. The voter’s attention to
the campaign does not determine how much she learns from it, but rather what the voter can learn
from the campaign determines how much attention she pays to it
Figure 3b illustrates the negative consequences of the voter’s curses on her welfare. It shows the
voter’s expected equilibrium welfare as a function of her gain from change. As indicated above, the
voter’s expected welfare is highest in a separating equilibrium. When no candidate proposes the
new policy, the voter gets a payoff of 0. When candidate 1 commits to the new policy independent
of his type, the voter gets a strictly positive expected payoff since electoral communication acts
as an imperfect screening device. A competent candidate exerts more effort since he has more to
gain from being in office and implementing the new policy (kc > kn). Successful communication is
a sufficiently accurate signal of competence so that the voter’s expected welfare is higher than in












(Change Vs. Status quo)
Always change
(b) Voter’s expected welfare
Figure 3
In figure 3a, the dark line is the voter’s communication effort toward party 1 candidate; the blue dotted line is
party 1 candidates’ average communication effort. In figure 3b, the dark line is the voter’s welfare.
(parameter values: q = 1/2, kc = 1/4, kn = 1/2, τ = 1.01,
Cv(x) = (1/5)(x+ (1− x) log(1− x)− x2/2), C(y) = (1/10)(y + (1− y) log(1− y)− y2/2)).
6 Implications
Our result suggests that the electoral process performs best (i.e., the voter’s welfare is maximized)
when two conditions are met. First, it is essential that the gain from change is intermediary (Propo-
sition 2). Second, it is necessary that the the cost of implementing policy change is sufficiently
high (Proposition 3).
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In our theory, the gain from change corresponds to the voter’s political engagement, that
is how much the voter cares about politics. Consequently, our first condition has important
implications for voters’ role in democracy. Scholars have long debated voters’ capacity to fulfill
their democratic duties, with some arguing that voters are at best incompetent (e.g., Campbell
et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Achen and Bartles, 2004) and others asserting that voters are no
fools (e.g., Key, 1966; Page, 1978; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). But all scholars agree that more
engaged voters would improve the performance of democratic systems. Our paper shows that this
claim needs to be qualified. The curse of the engaged voter implies that when the voter’s political
engagement is high, the electoral process loses its effectiveness as screening and disciplining device.
Both competent and non-competent politicians propose the new policy. The voter reduces her
attention to politics (Proposition 4), is unable to distinguish between the two and consequently,
might be worse off (Corollary 2). This decrease in the voter’s attention indicates that we cannot
deduce how much voters care about politics from voters’ level of activity.
An important implication of our theory is that political engagement can have negative con-
sequences even when one considers fully rational voters who are motivated by selecting the right
kind of politician. This conclusion complements the well-known danger of the “transient impulses”
of passion which can lead to undesirable political outcomes (e.g., Federalist no.71).
Different proposals have been advanced to foster political engagement. Scholars have argued
in favor of increased subsidies for public service broadcasting to decrease the cost of political
information (Soroka et al., 2013; O’Mahen, 2013). As the next proposition shows, this policy
would have an ambivalent effect on the voter’s welfare in our model. It would alleviate the curse
of the apathetic voter and facilitate welfare-improving policy change when the voter is disengaged.
But it would also exacerbate the curse of the engaged voter and impede welfare-improving policy
change when the voter’s political engagement is high.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the voter’s cost of communication decreases from Cv(x) to C˘v(x) =
λCv(x), with λ < 1. There exist non-empty open sets of policy costs, λ and G such that the voter’s
expected equilibrium welfare and level of attention are lower with C˘v(.) than Cv(.).
As stated above, a second favorable condition for welfare-improving policy change is that (for
a given level of political engagement) the cost of implementing the alternative is sufficiently high.
This policy cost depends on the institutional environment faced by elected politicians such as
number of veto players, supermajority requirement, constraints on the use of emergency procedures,
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etc.. Our results imply that increasing the status quo bias in institutions (i.e., increasing the
policy costs) can improve the voter’s welfare. Our argument is unrelated to the traditional idea
of preventing a tyranny of the majority (Federalist no.10 and 51).15 Greater status quo bias
in institutions increases a competent candidate’s policy cost. This reduces his communication
effort when he commits to the new policy and consequently, it softens electoral competition and
partially mutes the curse of the engaged voter. A non-competent candidate who commits to the
status quo policy has still a relatively high probability of winning the election and less incentive
to run on a harmful reformist platform. Greater status quo bias also increases non-competent
politicians’ policy cost, which decreases further their incentives to promise changes. Paradoxically,
an institutional environment ex ante less favorable to policy change might actually promote policy
change. The reason is that high policy costs preserve the effectiveness of the electoral process as
a screening and disciplining device, especially in times where political engagement is high.
However, there exists a trade-off in the design of institutions. Imposing a relatively high
policy cost ensures that commitment to the new policy still signals a candidate’s competence
when political engagement is high. But it also exacerbates the curse of the apathetic voter. The
voter is less able to incentivize competent politicians to implement the new policy when political
engagement is low. If crises correspond to a time when the gain from change is high (see for
example, Drazen and Grilli, 1993), then understanding the frequency of crises–particularly, but
not exclusively, economic crises–may help resolve this trade-off. If crises are frequent, the curse
of the engaged voter should be the main concern and a high status quo bias in institutions might
be optimal. Inversely, if crises are rare, the curse of the apathetic voter is the main problem and
policy costs should be low.16
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the commonly assumed premise that a more engaged electorate im-
proves the democratic process must be qualified. In line with previous theories, we find that there
15Our argument is also different than Gehlbach and Malesky’s (2010), who show that additional veto players
can be beneficial because they increase the cost of buying votes for an organized minority who wishes to stall
welfare-improving reforms, and Hao Li (2001), who demonstrates that an institutional status quo bias can mitigate
free riding problems in a group.
16In the latter case, institutional change is more complicated since a decrease in policy costs has conflicting effects:
both competent and non-competent politicians have greater incentives to run on a reformist platform. This again
justifies institutions making implementation of policy changes difficult.
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exists a curse of the apathetic voter. Too little interest in politics leads to bad political outcomes
for the voter. More surprisingly, this paper shows that there exists a curse of the engaged voter.
Too much incentives to pay attention to politics might lead to a lower equilibrium welfare and a
less active voter since political communication loses almost entirely its informational value due to
politicians’ equilibrium response to the voter’s engagement.
Our theory yields two important predictions for the study of democracy. First, it is not pos-
sible to deduce from voters’ level political activity how much they care about politics. Second,
policies meant to increase voters’ political engagement (such as increased subsidies for public ser-
vice broadcasting or facilitating policy changes) might have negative unintended consequences on
voters’ welfare and attention to politics as a result of the curse of the engaged voter.
Our paper is a first step towards a better understanding of voters’ and politicians’ strategic
choices of attention and communication, as well as their influence on the performance of the
democratic process. As such, the use of a representative voter and a common value environment
seem natural. We are aware, however, that these assumptions might conceal interesting effects
which deserve further attention in future research. We believe an extension of our theoretical
framework could prove useful to study the influence of special interest groups and of varied groups
of voters with distinct policy preferences on policy-making.
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Appendix A: Proofs
We first introduce some notation. Denote by σj(t) = (pj(tj), yj(tj)) ∈ {0, 1} × [0, 1] the strategy
(policy choice and communication effort) of a type t candidate j (t ∈ {c, n}, j ∈ {1, 2}). The tuple
of strategies is denoted by σj ≡ (σj(c), σj(n)). Denote by mj ∈ {∅, pj} the outcome of candidate j’s
campaign, i.e. whether the message is observed by the voter. If mj = ∅ (mj = pj), communication
has been unsuccessful (successful). We also denote by µ(mj, xj) = µj the voter’s posterior belief
that candidate j is competent conditional on observing mj and her communication effort xj.
Finally, denote voter’s electoral strategy (probability of electing candidate 1): s1(m1,m2,x) ∈
[0, 1].







⇔ Eµ(uv(p1, x1, x2)|m1, σ1) T Eµ(uv(p2, x1, x2)|m2, σ2);
2) yj(tj, pj) = argmaxy∈[0,1] E(uj(pj, y; tj)|x, s1, σ−j), j ∈ {1, 2}, tj ∈ {c, n};
3) x = argmaxx,x′ E(uv(pe, x, x
′)|s1, σ1, σ2);
4) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}, tj ∈ {c, n}, pj(tj) =
 10 ⇔ E(uj(1, yj(tj, 1); tj)|x, s1, σ−j) R E(uj(0, yj(tj, 0); tj)|x, s1, σ−j);
5) µ(mj, xj) satisfies Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Note that condition 1) is equivalent to: after observing mj and m−j, the voter elects candidate
j with probability 1 rather than his opponent (−j) (j ∈ {1, 2}) if and only if (∀mj, m−j, σj, and
σ−j):
µjpj(c)G+ (1− µj)pj(n)L > µ−jp−j(c)G+ (1− µ−j)p−j(n)L (5)
We first prove Lemma 1. We introduce the following notation. Denote by Γ(σj(t), σ−j) the
probability that a type t candidate j is elected when she plays strategy σj(t) and his opponent
17When indifferent, we suppose that candidates follow the strategy which maximizes the voter’s welfare as it is
usual.
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plays σ−j (t ∈ {c, n}). We have:






where A is the event: ‘equation (5) holds’ and B is the event when both sides are equal. The
expectation operator is over the probability of successful communication with candidate j ∈
{1, 2}, candidate −j and candidate −j’s type. It is obvious that Γ(σj(t), σ−j) is increasing with
µ(pj(t);σj)pj(c)G+ (1− µ(pj(t);σj))pj(n)L and µ(∅;σj)pj(c)G+ (1− µ(∅;σj))pj(n)L.
Lemma 6. There is no equilibrium when a competent candidate j chooses pj(c) = 0 and a non-
competent candidate j chooses pj(n) = 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
First, suppose a non-competent candidate j plays σj(n) = (1, yj(n)), yj(n) > 0 and a competent
candidate j chooses pj(c) = 0. When communication with the voter is successful, a non-competent
candidate j is elected with strictly positive probability if and only if (by (5)):
L ≥ µ(m−j, x−j)p−j(c)G+ (1− µ(m−j, x−j))p−j(n)L, m−j ∈ {∅, p−j(t)}
When communication with the voter is not successful, a non-competent candidate j is elected with
strictly positive probability if and only if:
(1− µ(∅, xj))L ≥ µ(m−j, x−j)p−j(c)G+ (1− µ(m−j, x−j))p−j(n)L
Under our assumptions on the cost functions (see Assumption 2) and yj(n) > 0, we have µ(∅, xj) ∈
(0, 1). Then it must be that: (1 − µ(∅, xj))L > L. Therefore, a type n candidate’s probability of
being elected is strictly greater when mj = ∅. Because a candidate always values being in office
(kn < 1) and communication is costly, σj(n) = (1, yj(n)) is strictly dominated by σj(n) = (1, 0).
Hence we have reached a contradiction.
Now suppose a non-competent candidate j plays σj(n) = (1, 0). Since the voter never observes
his platform, his choice of pj(n) does not affect his probability of being elected. Since the new
policy is costly (kn > 0), it must be that σj(n) = (1, 0) is strictly dominated by (0, 0). This
completes the proof.
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A non-competent candidate never wants to choose p = 1 when a competent type chooses
p = 0. By separating, he simultaneously lowers the probability of election and his expected payoff
conditional on election (due to the policy cost).
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix candidate −j’s strategy σ−j. Using Lemma 6, we need to consider only
three cases: 1) pj(c) = 0, pj(n) = 0, 2) pj(c) = 1, pj(n) = 0, and 3) pj(c) = 1, pj(n) = 1.
In case 1), successful communication has no impact on the probability of being elected since
the voter’s payoff does not depend on a candidate’s type.
In case 2), using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that a type n
exerts zero communication effort. Successful communication thus reveals a candidate is competent
and implements the reform policy. The voter’s expected payoff of electing candidate j is higher
after successful communication. Consequently, candidate j’s probability of winning the election is
higher after successful communication (see (5)).
In case 3), at the communication subform both types solve the same maximization problem
modulo the policy cost. A type n’s value of office is lower under the assumption that kc < kn.
Therefore, a type c’s communication effort is weakly higher (as a result of condition 2 in Definition
1).18 Successful communication thus weakly increases the voter’s posterior regarding candidate j’s
competence and thus her expected payoff from electing candidate j. The probability she elects
candidate j is higher.
Proof of Lemma 2. Necessity :
To prove necessity, we prove the counterpart: pj = 0⇒ yj = 0.
On the equilibrium path, given pj(t) a type t candidate j chooses yj(t) to maximize:
max
y≥0
Γ((pj(t), y), σ−j)(1− pj(t)kt)− C(y), j ∈ {1, 2} t ∈ {c, n} (6)
yj(t) affects Γ(.; .) only through the probability that the voter observes mj(t) = pj(t).
Using Lemma 6, we just need to focus on two cases: 1) pj(c) = pj(n) = 0 and 2) pj(c) = 1 and
pj(n) = 0.
Take case 1). We have: µ(mj(t) = 0; σj)∗0 + (1−µ(0;σj))∗0 = 0 = µ(mj(t) = ∅;σj)∗0 + (1−
µ(∅;σj))∗0. So it does not matter whether the voter observes mj(t) = pj(t) or mj(t) = ∅ (because
18This can also be shown by contradiction using a similar reasoning as in Lemma 6. If we have y(n) > y(c), then
a type n has a successful deviation to communication effort y(c) so it cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
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the voter anticipates correctly candidates’ strategy in equilibrium). Since communication is costly,
it must be that: yj(t) = 0.
Take case 2). We have: µ(mj = 0;σj) = 0. This implies that: µ(mj(n) = 0;σj) ∗ G + (1 −
µ(0;σj)) ∗ 0 = 0 < µ(mj(n) = ∅;σj) ∗ G + (1 − µ(∅;σj)) ∗ 0. The strict inequality comes from
Assumption 1 and the fact that the voter does not observe a candidate’s message with probability
1 (Assumption ??), so we have: µ(mj(t) = ∅;σj) > 0, and Assumption 1. Since Γ(., .) is increas-
ing with µ(mj(t);σj) ∗ G, a type n candidate j wants to minimize the probability that the voter
observes mj = 0. Since, in addition communication is costly, it must be that a type n candidate j
chooses yj(n) = 0 when pj(n) = 0 and pj(c) = 1.
Sufficiency:
Now consider the case of a candidate choosing p = 1. Using Lemma 6, we just need to focus on
two cases: 1) pj(c) = pj(n) = 1 and 2) pj(c) = 1 and pj(n) = 0.
Take case 1). Suppose both types choose y = 0. Then using the same reasoning as in Lemma 6,
we can see that σj(1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0) so it cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose only a non-competent type communicates. We have then: µ(mj(t) = 1; σj) ∗G+ (1−
µ(1;σj))∗L = L < µ(mj(t) = ∅;σj)∗G+(1−µ(∅;σj))∗L. So a non-competent type does not want
to communicate (since communication is costly and reduces his electoral chances). Therefore, it
cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose only a competent type communicates. Then, we have using
the same reasoning as in Lemma 6, that σj(n) = (1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0) so it cannot
be an equilibrium. Therefore, the only possibility left is that: yj(c) > 0 and yj(n) > 0 when
pj(c) = pj(n) = 1 is on the equilibrium path.
Lastly, consider case 2). Suppose yj(c) = 0. Then, as above, we can easily show that σj(c) =
(1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0) since kc > 0. This implies that pj(c) = 1 cannot be an
equilibrium choice when yj(c) = 0.
Summarizing this, we get that p = 1 is an equilibrium choice only if y = 1 which completes the
proof.
Lemma 7. A separating equilibrium exists only if µ(m1 = ∅, x∗1)G = µ(m2 = ∅, x∗2)G where
x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) is the voter’s equilibrium communication efforts.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose µ(m1 = ∅, x∗1)G > µ(m2 = ∅, x∗2)G. Since by Lemma
2, we must have y∗j (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}, the above inequality implies that a type n candidate 2 is
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never elected. In fact, the voter always elects candidate 1 when both candidates’ communication is
not successful, by (5). A type n candidate 2’s expected utility is thus 0, but if a type n candidate
2 pretends to be competent by choosing strategy σˆ2(n) = (1, yˆ2(n)), where yˆ2(n) is his optimal
communication effort, his expected utility is strictly positive (see the proof of Proposition 1 for more
details). Therefore, a type n candidate 2 prefers to commit to the reform policy and a separating
equilibrium cannot exist. The same reasoning shows that µ(m1 = ∅, x∗1)G < µ(m2 = ∅, x∗2)G is
impossible on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, we have: y∗j (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Consider now a competent candidate. Without loss of generality (WLOG), we focus on a (com-
petent) candidate 1. He takes his opponent’s (y2) and the voter’s (x = (x1, x2)) communication
efforts as given. His expected utility, when he chooses communication effort y1, is:
V1(1, y1; c) = q
(














A competent candidate gets 1− kc when he gets elected, and 0 otherwise. When he faces a com-
petent candidate 2, he wins with probability 1 when he communicates successfully with the voter
is successful and his opponent does not; with probability 1/2 when both communicate success-
fully (since the voter is indifferent) and when both are unsuccessful; and probability 0, otherwise.
Remember that by Lemma 7, the voter must be indifferent between both candidates when com-
munication with both is unsuccessful. When he faces a non-competent candidate, he wins the
election with probability 1 when communication is successful (this occurs with probability y1x1).
When communication is unsuccessful, he wins with probability 1/2. In all cases, he has to pay his
cost of communication.








(1− kc)− q(1− kc)y2x2
2
− C(y1)






Similarly, for a competent candidate 2, we get: C ′(y2(c)) = 1−kc2 x2.













(1 + y1x1)− Cv(x1)− Cv(x2)

In a separating equilibrium, using (5), the voter randomizes between both candidates when com-
munication with both is successful or unsuccessful (Lemma 7). When communication is successful
only with candidate 1 (2), she elects candidate 1 (2).













We can see that y∗j (c) and x
∗
j (j ∈ {1, 2}) are defined by the following system of two equations:









y∗j (c), j ∈ {1, 2}
We now show there exists a unique strictly positive solution to this system of equations. By Lemma
2, it must be the players’ equilibrium communication strategies.







)−C ′v(x). By Assumption 2, this function is continuously
differentiable. A necessary condition for the existence of a strictly positive y∗j (c) and x
∗
j , j ∈ {1, 2}
is that the function h(x) has a 0 on (0, 1). Under Assumption 2, h(0) = 0 and limx→1 h(x) = −∞.













)) − C ′′v (x∗)




so h′(0) > 0 (i.e.,
h′(x) x→0−−→ +∞). Hence there exists a strictly positive solution to (3) and (4).
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This solution is unique if h′′(x) ≤ 0. Using chain rules, we get:






















))3 − C ′′′v (x)
Since C(.), C ′(.) and C ′v(.) are convex, we have that h
′′(.) ≤ 0.






2 and the equilibrium communication strategies are
unique as claimed.
Before proving Proposition 1, we show Lemmata 8 and 9.





, where y∗(c) and x∗ are the strictly positive
solutions to (3) and (4).
Proof. Using the properties of h(x), defined in the proof of Lemma 3, we know that we must have:



















− C ′′(y∗(c))C ′′v (x∗)
C ′′(y∗(c))
Where we use C ′(y∗(c)) = 1−kc
2







Lemma 9. The voter and competent candidate’s communication effort (resp. x∗ and y∗(c) defined















Proof. We only show point 1. Point 2. follows using a similar reasoning. By the Implicit Function
Theorem (IFT), we have:
∂y∗(c)
∂kc
































By Lemma 8, C ′′(y∗(c))C ′′v (x




(given x∗ > 0, y∗ > 0 and Assumption 2.iii).
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 3, we know competent candidates’ and the voter’s commu-
nication strategies when the candidates play a separating strategy.
We determine when a competent candidate j (j ∈ {1, 2}) prefers campaigning on pj = 1 (with
communication effort y∗j (c)) than deviating and choosing to uphold the status quo (pj = 0). When
a competent candidate chooses pj = 1, he gets:
Vj(1, y
∗
j (c); c) =




(1− kc)− C(y∗j (c))
=
1 + (1− q)y∗(c)x∗
2
(1− kc)− C(y∗(c))
where the second line comes from the fact that we have y∗j (c) = y
∗(c), j ∈ {1, 2} and x∗j = x∗, j ∈
{1, 2} (see Lemma 3).
When he deviates and chooses to campaign on the status quo policy (p = 0), he gets:









He has 50% chance of being elected against a non-competent candidate and against a competent
candidate conditional on communication not being successful. He gets 1 when he is elected since
he does not implement the new policy. By Lemma 2, he does not exert any communication effort
when he chooses pj = 0.
We have that a competent candidate j prefers pj = 1 to pj = 0 if and only if: Vj(1, y
∗(c); c) ≥
Vj(0, 0; c). We show that ∃!k∗c ∈ (0, 1) such that this condition is satisfied if and only if kc ≤ k∗c .
Using Lemma 9, we know that y∗(c) and x∗ are decreasing with kc. Using the Envelope Theorem
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(1− q)y∗(c)∂x∗/∂kc − qx∗∂y∗(c)/∂kc
2

















∗(c); c)−V1(0, 0; c))/dkc < 0. If it exists, there is a unique k∗c (G) defined as the
solution to V1(1, y
∗(c); c) = V1(0, 0; c) ⇔ y∗(c)x∗−2C(y∗(c))1+(1−q)y∗(c)x∗ = kc such that the (IC) of a competent
type is satisfied for all kc ≤ k∗c (G). Given that x∗ and y∗(c) depend on G, we have: k∗c (.) is a
function of G.
To show existence, remember x∗ and y∗(c) are strictly positive. The objective function of a

















. (Slightly abusing notation), take kc → 1,
V1(1, y
∗(c); c) = 0 < V1(0, 0; c). By the Intermediate Value Theorem, k∗c exists and k
∗
c (G) ∈ (0, 1).
We now consider a non-competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint. When he




When he campaigns on pj = 1, he invests yˆ
∗(n) in communication, where (using a similar reasoning














A non-competent candidate prefers pj = 0 to pj = 1 if and only if: Vj(0, 0;n) ≤ Vj(1, yˆ∗(n);n).
We show that there exists a unique k∗n : R+ × [0, 1) → [0, 1] such that this condition is sat-
isfied ∀kn ≥ k∗n(G, kc). Since Vj(0, 0;n) and Vj(1, yˆ∗(n);n) depend on y∗(c) and x∗, which de-
pends on kc and G, k
∗




< 0 and dVj(0, 0;n)/dkn = 0. To prove the existence of k
∗
n(G, kc), we apply
the same reasoning as in the existence of k∗c (G).
Lemma 10. k∗c (G) is increasing with y
∗(c) and x∗.19
Proof. Ignoring the argument in k∗c for simplicity. We have that k
∗
c is defined as the unique solution
to k∗c =
y∗(c)x∗−2C(y∗(c))
1+(1−q)y∗(c)x∗ . The left hand side is increasing with x
∗. To see that it is increasing with
y∗(c), denote R(y∗(c)) = y
∗(c)x∗−2C(y∗(c))
1+(1−q)y∗(c)x∗ and S(y
∗(c)) = (x∗ − 2C ′(y∗(c)))(1 + (1 − q)y∗(c)x∗) −
(1− q)x∗(y∗(c)x∗ − 2C(y∗(c))). We have: sign(R′(y∗(c))) = sign(S(y∗(c))).
S(y∗(c)) = (x∗ − (1− k∗c )x∗)(1 + (1− q)y∗(c)x∗)− (1− q)x∗(y∗(c)x∗ − 2C(y∗(c)))
= x∗k∗c (1 + (1− q)y∗(c)x∗)− (1− q)x∗(y∗(c)x∗ − 2C(y∗(c)))
= qx∗(x∗y∗(c)− 2C(y∗(c))) > 0
The first line comes from (3), the last line from the definition of k∗c and k
∗
c > 0 by Proposition 1.
Using these two results, we see that we must have k∗c increasing with y
∗(c) and x∗.
Lemma 11. k∗n(G, kc) is increasing with y
∗(c) and x∗ (and does not depend on yˆ∗(n)).
Proof. Ignoring the argument in k∗n for simplicity. k
∗





By inspection, it is increasing with y∗(c). Regarding x∗, we know that ∂k∗n/∂x
∗ has the same
sign as: yˆ∗(n)(1 + yˆ∗(n)x∗ − qy∗(c)x∗)− (yˆ∗(n)− qy∗(c))(yˆ∗(n)x∗ − 2C(yˆ∗(n))) which reduces to:
yˆ∗(n) + (yˆ∗(n) − qy∗(c))2C(yˆ∗(n)). Since yˆ∗(n) − qy∗(c) > −1 and yˆ∗(n) > yˆ∗(n)x∗. We have
yˆ∗(n) + (yˆ∗(n)− qy∗(c))2C(yˆ∗(n)) > yˆ∗(n)x∗ − 2C(yˆ∗(n)) > 0. (We know from Proposition 1 that
k∗n > 0⇔ yˆ∗(n)x∗− 2C(yˆ∗(n)) > 0). By the Envelope Theorem, k∗n does not depend on yˆ∗(n).
Lemma 12. We have that:
i. ∂k∗c (G)/∂G > 0
ii. ∂k∗n(G, kc)/∂G > 0 and ∂k
∗
n(G, kc)/∂kc < 0.
19Remember that in the definition of k∗c , y
∗(c) and x∗ are both evaluated at kc = k∗c (see Proposition 1).
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Proof. From Lemma 9, we know that x∗ and y∗(c) increase with G and decrease with kc. k∗c (G)
is increasing with x∗ and y∗(c) (see Lemma 10). Therefore, k∗c (G) increases with G. k
∗
n(G, kc)
is increasing with y∗(c) and x∗ (and it does not depend on yˆ∗(n), see Lemma 11). Therefore,
k∗n(G, kc) increases with G and decreases with kc.
Proof of Corollary 1. In what follows, we ignore the gain from change to alleviate the exposition.
All the results hold for all G. From Lemma 12, we know that k∗n(kc) is decreasing with kc. It is
thus sufficient to prove that k∗n(k
∗
c ) = k
∗
c to prove the Corollary.
Suppose kc = k
∗
c . When (slightly abusing notation) kn = k
∗
c , then yˆ
∗(n) = y∗(c) and
V (1, yˆ∗(n);n) = 1+y
∗(c)x∗−(1−q)y∗(c)x∗
2
(1−k∗c )−C(yˆ∗(n)) = V (0, 0;n), where the last equality follows




c ) = k
∗
c .
Proof of Remark 1. A type c candidate j’s (IC) is (see the proof of Propositon 1):
Vj(1, y
∗
j (c); c) =





















It is clear that the left-hand-side is increasing with x∗ and the right hand side is decreasing with
x∗ and y∗−j(c), which proves the claim for a competent candidate. Using a similar reasoning, we
can show that an increase in x∗ and y∗−j(c) tightens a type n candidate (remember the inequality
is reversed for a type n’s (IC)).
Proof of Lemma 4. See Lemma 9.
Lemma 13. There exist a unique kc > 0 and a unique kn(kc) : [0, 1) → [0, 1] which satisfy
kc < kn(kc), ∀kc ∈ (0, kc) such that, for any given kc ∈ (0, kc) and any given kn ∈ (kc, kn(kc)),
there exists a unique G > 0, G < G < ∞ such that a separating equilibrium exists if and only if
G ∈ [G,G].
Proof. We first prove necessity.
Proposition 1 defines necessary and sufficient conditions such that candidates separate. Denote
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kc = limG→∞ k∗c (G).
20 If kc > kc, a competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint is
never satisfied. Assume then that kc < kc.
We know that k∗c (G) increases with G (Lemma 12). We also have: limG→0 k
∗
c (G) = 0. To see
that, note that we must have x∗ = 0 when G = 0. This implies y∗(c) = 0. A competent candidate
gets (1 − kc)/2 if she chooses pj = 1 and 1/2 if she chooses pj = 0. Therefore, we must have:
limG→0 k∗c (G) = 0.
We thus have: limG→0 k∗c = 0 < kc < kc. By the Theorem of Intermediate Values and Lemma
12, there exists a unique G such that k∗c (G) = kc and k
∗
c (G) ≥ kc, ∀G ≥ G.
We now define the upper bound on G. There exists a separating equilibrium only if kn ≥
k∗n(G, kc).
We have that k∗n(G, kc) increases with G (see Lemma 12). Denote kn(kc) = limG→∞ k
∗
n(G, kc).
By Proposition 1, kn(0) < 1. Since k
∗
n(G, kc) decreases with kc, we have: kn(kc) < 1.
We show that ∀kn < kn(kc), there exists a unique G < ∞ such that ∀G ≥ G, k∗n(G, kc) ≥ kn.
We have: k∗n(kc, G) = kc < kn (the equality comes from Corollary 1 and the definition of G, i.e.
kc = k
∗
c (G)), so we must have G > G
Given any kc ∈ (0, kc) and kn ∈ (kc, kn(kc)), we thus have that there exist unique G > 0 and
G < G <∞ such that a separating equilibrium exists only if G ∈ [G,G].
We now prove sufficiency.
Consider the following assessment:
• The candidates’ strategies are: σj = ((1, y∗(c)), (0, 0)), j ∈ {c, n}, y∗(c) defined in Lemma 3;
• The voter’s communication strategy is: x∗ = (x∗, x∗), x∗ defined in Lemma 3;
• The voter’s electoral strategy is: s(m1 = 1,m2 = ∅,x∗) = 1, s(m1 = 1,m2 = 1,x∗) =
1/2, s(m1 = ∅,m2 = 1,x∗) = 0, s(m1 = ∅,m2 = ∅,x∗) = 1/2
It is easy to check that the voter’s electoral strategy is a best response to the candidates’ strategies
given the voter’s Bayesian posterior. The communication efforts are best responses according to
Lemma 3. Lastly, given kc ∈ (0, kc), kn ∈ [0, kn(kc)), and G ∈ [G,G], the candidates’ policy
20Assumption 2 guarantees that y∗(c) and x∗ are continuous and bounded in G. This implies that k∗c (G) is
continuous and bounded in G (see the proof of Proposition 1). Therefore, the limit is well-defined.
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choices (and strategies) are incentive compatible by the reasoning above and Proposition 1. Thus,
the separating assessment described above is an equilibrium according to Definition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows directly from Lemma 13.
Proof of Corollary 2. Denote V ev (G) the voter’s maximal ex-ante expected equilibrium welfare as a
function of G. Suppose kc < kc and kn < kn(kc) such that there exist G, G such that a separating
equilibrium ∀G ∈ [G,G] (Proposition 2). For a given G, the voter’s expected payoff is strictly
higher in a separating assessment than any other assessment for a non-empty open set of policy
costs (see Appendix B for more details). Therefore, there exists a non-empty open set of policy
costs such that V ev (G− δ) > V ev (G+ δ), with δ > 0.21
Proof of Lemma 5. See Lemma 9
Proof of Proposition 3. We only prove necessity. Sufficiency follows a similar reasoning as in the
proof of Proposition 2.
From Proposition 1, we know that a separating equilibrium exists only if kn ≥ k∗n(G, kc).
Suppose kn > k
∗
n(G, 0). By Proposition 1 and Lemma 12, we know that a separating equilibrium
always exists then. We can thus note: kc(G) = 0 < k
∗
c (G). It is clear that kc(G) is constant in a
neighborhood of G in this case.
Suppose now kn ≤ k∗n(G, 0). Implicitly define kc(G) by kn = k∗n(kc(G), G). By Corollary 1
(k∗n(G, k
∗
c (G)) = k
∗
c (G) < kn), Lemma 12 (k
∗
n(.) decreases with kc), and the theorem of intermediate
values, kc(G) exists, is unique and satisfies kc(G) < k
∗
c . Furthermore, kn ≥ k∗n(G, kc)⇔ kc ≥ kc(G).
Using the definition of kc(G) above and the implicit function theorem, it is easy to see that
kc(G) strictly increases with G by Lemma 12.
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose G and kn are such that kn ∈ (k∗c (G), k∗n(G, 0)] (this interval is non-
empty since k∗n(G, kc) is decreasing with kc, which implies k
∗
c (G) = k
∗
n(G, kcj(G)) < k
∗
n(G, 0)).
Denote khc = kc(G) + γ and k
l
c = kc(G) − γ, with γ > 0. A separating assessment maximizes the
voter’s ex-ante expected welfare (see Appendix B). We thus have that there exists γ > 0 such that
∀γ ∈ [0, γ], the voter is better off when kc = khc (since a separating equilibrium exists) than when
kc = k
l
c (since a separating equilibrium does not exist). Hence, the claim holds.
21In Appendix B, we show that there exists k˘n(G, kc) > kc such that the voter’s ex-ante expected pay-
off is highest when the candidates play a separating strategy. The claim thus holds for the following set:
{kc ∈ (0, kc, kn ∈ (0, kn(0)|kc < kn < max{k˘n(G, kc), kn(kc)}}. This set is non-empty since G→ G as kn → kc and
kc < max{k˘n(G, kc), kn(kc)}.
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Lemma 14. There exists k̂n : R+ × [0, 1] → (kc, 1] continuous in both its arguments such that
for a given G, the voter’s combined communication effort in a separating assessment is strictly
greater than the voter’s combined communication effort in all other possible assessments for all
kn ∈ (kc, k̂n(G, kc)).
Proof. We first compare the voter’s communication efforts in a separating assessment and in a
pooling assessment for a given G.
In a separating assessment, the voter’s and competent candidates’ communication efforts are









Using a similar reasoning as in Lemma 3, we can show that in a pooling assessment (pj(t) =










p) =q(1− q)G− L
2
(yp(c)− yp(n))
=q(1− q)(1 + τ)G
2
(yp(c)− yp(n))
Using a similar reasoning as in Lemma 3, we can show that there exists at least one positive
solution. For our claim, we simply need to consider the solution with the highest communication
effort by the voter, denoted xp. Using the same reasoning as in Lemmata 8 and 9, we can show
that the voter’s and competent candidates’ communication efforts are continuously increasing with
G and kn and continuously decreasing with kc.
Now, as kn → 1, it is clear that xp > x∗ (since yp(n)→ 0 and (1+τ)G > G). Inversely, as kn →
kc, it is clear that x
p → 0 (since yp(n) → yp(c)) and so xp < x∗. By the theorem of intermediate
value, there exists a unique k̂n
p
(G, kc) ∈ (kc, 1) such that xp < x∗ for all kn < k̂n
p
(G, kc) (since
both xp and x∗ are continuous in G and kc, k̂n
p
(G, kc) is continuous in G and kc).
Using a similar logic (for details, see Appendix B), we can show:




(G, kc) ∈ (kc, 1] (continuous in G and kc) such that the voter’s communication effort towards





∗ for all kn < k̂n
pj
(G, kc) (continuous
in G and kc) for all j ∈ {1, 2} (by Lemma 2, xpj−j = 0);
ii) in an assessment when pj(c) = pj(n) = 1 and p−j(c) = 1, p−j(n) = 0, there exists k̂n
a
(G, kc) ∈
(kc, 1] (continuous in G and kc) such that the voter’s communication effort towards candidate j in





∗ for all kn < k̂n
a
(G, kc) for all j ∈ {1, 2}.







Lemma 15. For all kc ∈ (0, kc), there exists ̂̂kn(kc) > kc such that for all kn ∈ (kc, ̂̂kn(kc)), we
have: kn < k̂n(G, kc).
Proof. Suppose k̂n(G, kc) is decreasing with G. The reasoning extends easily to the other cases
(just replace k̂n(G, kc) by minG∈(0,G] k̂n(G, kc) below). From Lemma 14, we know that k̂n(G, kc) >
kc, ∀G. From the proof of Proposition 3, we have that G → G as kn → kc. Slightly abusing
notation, this implies that kn = kc < k̂n(G, kc) = k̂n(G, kc). By continuity of k̂n(G, kc) in G and
kc, there exists
̂̂
kn(kc) > kc such that ∀kn ∈ (kc, ̂̂kn(kc)) we have: kn < k̂n(G, kc).
Proof of Proposition 4. For kc ∈ (0, kc) and kn ∈ (kc, ̂̂kn(kc)), we have that the voter exerts strictly
more communication effort in a separating assessment than in other assessment for all G ≤ G
(Lemmata 14 and 15). This directly implies point i.. Point ii. follows from the fact that x∗ is
increasing with G. Point iii. from the fact that the maximum total communication effort is unique
and equal to 2x∗ at G = G.
Lemma 16. There exists a non-empty open set of policy costs KG and λG ∈ [0, 1) such that for all
λ ∈ (λG, 1), there exists a non-empty open set GλG ⊂ R+ such that the voter’s expected equilibrium
welfare is lower with C˘v(.) than Cv(.) for all G ∈ GλG.
Proof. When the communication cost function is C˘v(x), equations (4) and (3) become:
C ′v(x˘
∗








A decrease in the communication cost function is thus equivalent to an increase in the gain from
change G.
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We know there exists a non-empty open set of policy costs such that an increase in G can
decrease the voter’s welfare (Corollary 2). Denote this set KG. Suppose there exists Gh ∈ [G,G)
such that ∀G > G, we have that the voter’s expected equilibrium welfare satisfies V ev (G) < V ev (Gh).
Then denote λG = 0 and for all λ ∈ (0, 1), the claim holds for GλG = (min{Gh, G/λ}, G).
Suppose there is no suchGh. Define φ : [G,G]→ (G,∞) as φ(G) = arg min {Z ∈ (G,∞) |V ev (G) = V ev (Z)}
for all G ∈ [G,G]. Define also λG = maxG∈[G,G] Gφ(G) . By Corollary 2, λG < 1. And the claim
holds true for GλG = (max{G,G/λG}, G).
Lemma 17. There exists a non-empty open set of policy costs Kx and λx ∈ [0, 1) such that for all
λ ∈ (λx, 1), there exists a non-empty open set Gλx ⊂ R+ such that the voter’s expected equilibrium
welfare is lower with C˘v(.) than Cv(.) for all G ∈ Gλx.
Proof. Using Proposition 4 and a similar reasoning as in Lemma 16, we can show that there exists
λx ∈ [0, 1) and Kx such that the claim holds true for Gλx = (Gl, G), where Gl is a lower bound
satisfying Gl < G.
Proof of Proposition 5. Using Lemmata 16 and 17, there exist an open set of policy costs KG∩Kx
(from Corollary 2 and Proposition 4, one can check that the intersection is not empty) and λ =
max{λG, λx} ∈ [0, 1) such that the claim holds true for the non-empty sets KG ∩ Kx, (λ, 1), and
Gλ = GλG ∩ Gλx (which is non empty by Lemmata 16 and 17).
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